Frank
Ledwidge, Losing Small
Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2011, viii + pp.267,
Notes, bibliography, Index, ISBN 978-0-300-16671-2
I
consider it to be the duty of anyone who sees a flaw in the plan not
to hesitate to say so
General
Einsenhower immediately before General Montgomery’s briefing for
Operation Overlord, 15th
May 1944
©
Frank Ellis 2012 All Rights Reserved
Anger and shame assailed me when I was reading Losing Small Wars: anger
with a corrupt Prime Minister (Blair) for the lies used to justify the
deployment of British forces to Iraq and Afghanistan and the
professional collusion of senior officers and the security services in
the dissemination of the lies; and shame for the untold misery inflicted
on Iraqi and Afghan civilians, the deaths and maiming of our soldiers
and the lies used to comfort their families and to mislead the public.
As if this was not bad enough, we are confronted at every turn in these
badly judged deployments with far too many examples of incompetent
political and military leadership in theatre. With all these failings
and the scale of the invasion and occupation in Iraq, and the NATO
mission in Afghanistan, Ledwidge’s title hardly does justice to what is
revealed. In any case these are hardly ‘small wars’: the lying alone was
and remains even now on a mass industrial scale.
If, having read
Losing Small Wars, I had to identify the single most important failing
about the disastrous British interventions in Iraq and, currently
Afghanistan, it would be the failure on the part of the British
government and its military advisers to spell out quite clearly why the
British armed forces were ever deployed to these two parts of the Middle
East. Factor out the obvious lies disseminated by Blair and his
political-military clique that Iraq was armed with weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) and that these weapons posed a threat to Britain and
there was no justified reason for Britain’s ever having had anything to
do with the US-led invasion of Iraq. Bush’s ravings that Saddam Hussein
was another Hitler reflect the appalling ignorance of American
presidents about the world. Such claims were intended to provide some
weak justification for Saddam Hussein’s removal from power. Nevertheless
they are pitiful claims. By the standards of Arab leaders Saddam
Hussein was averagely repressive. Oil is a factor on the Middle East but
did it require that the US and others invade Iraq and inflict such
dreadful misery and suffering? If we went there to impose democracy and
other Western abstractions then that too has been a catastrophic failure
and one that was bound to be in a part of the world where Islam rules.
Why do Americans and their too willing British allies not realise that
the liberal democracies that evolved in a small part of northern Europe
among small groups of racially homogenous peoples cannot be just imposed
on what are Third World tribal societies? Here we see a deadly serious
failure of imagination, caused by what Pat Buchanan has correctly
identified as democratic fundamentalism and which has been made to
appear fallaciously plausible by the malevolent ideology of
multiculturalism and neo-conservatism.
As for the British Army’s
being in Afghanistan, no British politician has yet provided a
convincing argument for the deployment. Brown’s claims that British
troops in Afghanistan made the UK safer were obvious lies and so
obviously clumsy one wonders why he thought he could get away with
peddling such nonsense. Equally mendacious are the claims that UK forces
are helping the Afghan population to build a better future. Do the
Taliban – they are part of the Afghan population – want our help? How do
we help people by laying their country waste and imposing utterly alien
institutions such as elections and education and undermining the
foundations of a tribal society? Other possible reasons for our being
there may be related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and fears about
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (and oil, of course). But even these are not
that convincing when trying to find an explanation for why Britain has
expended so much blood and treasure. Remove any geo-political
considerations and one is left with the interests and rivalries of the
three services. Ledwidge refers to remarks made by General Dannatt to a
British diplomat that if the British army, with an exit date from Iraq
established, did not redeploy its battle groups to Afghanistan, they
would be removed in any Strategic Defence Review. Ledwidge also suggests
that the British army wanted to go to Helmand to show what it could do
and attempt to compensate for its less than glorious performance in
southern Iraq. Another factor prompting the deployment was, as always, a
desire on the part of senior British politicians and officers to
ingratiate themselves with the Americans, to try to rebuild their
damaged stock.